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SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
KENNETH W. GIBB,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
EARL N. DORIUS, Director, Driver
License Division, State of Utah,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
13626

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Is the revocation of respondent's driver's license, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953), as amended,
for failure to take the chemical test, a refusal, when
respondent, relying on advice of counsel, refuses to submit to the test until his attorney is present, after having
had two phone calls with said attorney; is the right to contact counsel a right under the Hunter v. Dorius case to
have the attorney present prior to the taking of the chemical test or deciding to take the chemical test, or either
submitting or refusing said test; further, are the above two
issues moot in view of the court's ruling that Section 41Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
6-44.10 (f) was not complied with in the court's opinion
because Lynn Davis, City-County Health Lab Technician,
was not "an authorized lab technician" pursuant to the
statute?
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On October 8, 1973, the appellant revoked respondent's driver's license to drive for one year, effective September 13, 1973. This was due to respondent's failure to
submit to a sobriety test under Section 41-6-44.10, Utah
Code Annotated (1953), as amended. Pursuant to the
act, respondent filed a petition for trial de novo in the
Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, for
a determination of whether respondent's license was subject to revocation. The case was heard before the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins on the 18th day of December,
1973. Judge Wilkins found after a hearing that respondent's motion to set aside the revocation order be granted
and that the action be dismissed upon the merits and
that the respondent have and recover his driving privilege.
Said order was signed and entered on the 29th day of
January, 1974. According to the conclusions of law entered by the court of date, Judge Wilkins held that the
order entered on the 8th of October, 1973, was unlawful
and in excess of appellant's authority and jurisdiction;
further, that the petitioner had a right to rely upon the
representations made by the arresting officer that he had
a right to counsel, and that the arresting officer was in
error, after informing petitioner of his right and refusing
to allow him to obtain such counsel prior to requesting
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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that he either submit or refuse a chemical test for sobriety. Further, that the question of petitioner's refusal
to submit to a chemical test was moot in light of the fact
that the State failed to prove a duly authorized k b technician as required in Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(f)
(1953), as amended, was provided.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's judgment findings of fact and conclusions of law granting a
return of the respondent's driver's license and seeks an
order in harmony with the appellant's order of revocation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Trooper Wayne Albert Smith testified that respondent was observed in a Chevrolet Pickup Truck going
northbound on Interstate 1-15 Freeway and turning into
the emergency lane and then going off onto the shoulder
portion of the road in a zigzag pattern (R. 33). The
trooper followed him from just north of 17th South until
stopping the subject's car at approximately 12th South.
He noticed the odor of alcohol (R. 33, 34) and he asked
Mr. Gibb, the respondent, to step back to the highway
patrol vehicle and as he did so he observed the respondent
walking, which he indicated was in a staggering and
unsteady manner. No field agility tests were given (R.
34). Trooper Smith placed him under arrest and read
him the Miranda rights (R. 35) and respondent indicated
that he would talk to the Trooper (R. 35). Trooper Smith
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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asked the respondent if he would submit to a chemical
test and asked him if he had a preference as to which
test he would take, to which the respondent indicated he
had no preference, but that if it was okay, he would take
the blood test. The Trooper then called the dispatcher
to notify the technician for the purpose of drawing the
blood to meet at the county jail (R. 35). The respondent
was stopped at 4:01 a.m. on May 17,1973. He was placed
under arrest at 4:04 a.m. He was advised of his rights
at 4:09 a.m. (R. 35).
Thereafter, the respondent and Trooper Smith and
another highway patrolman, Trooper Tenney, proceeded
to the Salt Lake County Jail. Trooper Smith in the car
explained the implication of the Implied Consent Law
and the chemical test to the respondent, but did not
read the entire rights to him at the scene prior to leaving
for the jail. He did tell him that he was required to take
a test and that his license would be revoked if he refused
and did not have a valid reason for the refusal. The respondent and Trooper Smith and Trooper Tenney arrived at the jail and there met Mr. Lynn Davis, the CityCounty Lab Technician who was there for the purpose
of drawing the blood (R. 37). The respondent asked to
speak to an attorney and so Trooper Smith provided him
with a phone, the respondent made several phone calls
and then did contact an attorney represented to be Mr.
Reagan (R. 37). Mr. Gibb, after his conversation, requested that Trooper Smith talk to the attorney, which
conversation took place (R. 37) at which time Trooper
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Smith asked that his client subject himself to a chemical
test, either breath or blood (R. 37). Trooper Smith testified that Mr. Reagan said that he would not refuse the
test (that is his client) supplied but that he would not
agree to Mr. Gibb taking a test without him (Mr. Reagan)
being present at the jail(R. 38). Mr. Reagan, the attorney, was informed by Trooper Smith that he had no intention of interrogating Mr. Gibb at the jail further concerning the arrest for drunk driving or taking any of his
rights away but that he did request that he get an answer
as to whether Mr. Gibb could take the chemical test or
not and that Trooper Smith was the only other car on
the road that night and it was important for him to get
back to the highway (R. 38). These activities took place
between 4:45 a.m., the approximate time they arrived
at the jail and 5:30 a.m., the time that Trooper Smith
turned the respondent, Mr. Gibb, over to the jailer for
booking.
Trooper Smith testified that the respondent had a
lengthy conversation with his attorney, approximately
five or ten mintues, and could have been as much as
fifteen (R. 38-39). Mr. Gibb's attorney advised Trooper
Smith that he would not advise Mr. Gibb over the phone
and that he was going to come to the jail to speak to
Mr. Gibb in private, and Mr. Gibb's attorney informed
Mr. Gibb that he was coming to the jail to advise him
whether or not to submit to the chemical test. Trooper
Smith advised both the attorney for Mr. Gibb and Mr.
Gibb that there was no need for the attorney to come to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the county jail as far as the implied consent was concerned (R. 41) whereupon respondent, Mr. Gibb, said
that subsequent to him being informed of his rights under Section 41-6-44.10 that he would not submit to a test
unless his attorney was present. However, the record
reveals that he admitted to Mr. Davis, the technician,
affirmatively that he would refuse until his attorney was
present (R. 26). Attorney Reagan, attorney for respondent, stated by way of a stipulation that he arrived at
the jail at 5:25 a.m. and that on the phone prior to coming
to the jail, he notified Trooper Smith that in his opinion
what constituted right to counsel was not a phone call
but was the opportunity to personally interview and talk
to his client, to which Trooper Smith reiterated to attorney Reagan that his presence was not necessary as far
as the law and the refusal was concerned (R. 48).
The respondent, in. talking to the lab technician said
that at the time when he was asked if he would submit
to the test that he would refuse until his attorney was
present because if "we took his blood, he would lose his
license, but if he refused and we didn't wait for his attorney, he could get by ttw refusal hearing" (R. 26). (Emphasis supplied.)
On cross-examination after having testified as to his
qualifications, Mr. Lynn Davis, a chemist with the CityCounty Health Department for the previous nine and
one-half years, a medical technologist with the United
States Navy during World War II, and holding a bachelor
of arts degree in Bacteriology and Chemistry, with apDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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proximately twenty-five years' experience in clinical laboratory work, that he did not have on his person a card
or writing of any kind that indicated that he was authorized to draw blood by the State of Utah (R. 30). However, he did indicate he was authorized by the State Division of Health and was on the approved list with the
State Department of Health and that the State Department of Health monitored him as to his procedure in
running blood alcohol tests (R. 20). He indicated that
the authorization was in the form of a letter as to his
proficiency rating on the program of the State Division
of Health (R. 29). However, Mr. Davis answered Mr.
Gibb's attorney that he did not have a card from the
State of Utah, that he did have a card from the Director
of the City-County Health Department reflecting his
employment and authorization status.
The lower court's decision should be reversed for the
following reasons:
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE QUESTION OF PETITIONER'S REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO A CHEMICAL TEST
WAS MOOT BASED ON THE RULING
THAT THE CITY AND COUNTY LAB
TECHNICIAN WAS NOT A "DULY AUTHORIZED LABORATORY TECHNICIAN" AS
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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REQUIRED UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §
41-6-44.10 (f).
There is no specific case law on this subject as to
what constitutes a duly authorized laboratory technician
under the law in the State of Utah. However, the question as to what is a "duly authorized" agent or person
has been ruled on in other jurisdictions. A case in point
being an Indiana case of March, 1942, Wise v. Curdes,
et al.y 40 N. E. 2d 122, held on a question of what constitutes duly authorized as used in the bankruptcy act
that where an attorney had been directed to act for a
client and is acting within the scope of the agency it is
binding notwithstanding the absence of writing to that
effect or a formal power of attorney. A New York case,
People v. Johanerson, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 190, 199 (1944), on
question of a chiropractor and the practice of medicine
held that duly authorized by law meant authority under
the laws of the State and would require a medical decree
since the statute required one to practice. A more recent
case in Texas concerning a physician on a dispute as to
whether a physician licensed in one county could certify
pursuant to the election code for another county, the
court held in Olivarez v. Aquilar, Tex. Civ. App., 431
S. W. 2d 932 (1968), that a physician whose medical certificate was registered in Zapata County and who resided
in the county was a "duly licenced physician" within the
meaning of the election code and authorized to execute
medical certificates in support of application of voters
in Star County for absentee ballot for primary election
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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involving nomination for office and a constable in Star
County.
Two insurance cases likewise sustain the proposition
that a duly authorized agent refers not only to the form
but includes form and substance. Rosenthaul v. Monarch
Life Insurance Company, a 1935 case from the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 195 N. E. 339, involved
a suit brought to secure a decree to the effect that a policy
of accident and health indemnity insurance issued to the
plaintiff was reinstated after a lapse as in full force and
effect. The problem was that the insured's check for the
overdue payment of premium was received by the agent,
deposited to the credit of the insurer, in its bank, and
was duly collected and the proceeds held by the insurer
for almost two weeks. The court held that the agent
accepted the check in payment of the overdue premium
and that the duly authorized agent as used in the statute
providing for reinstatement referred to the representative
of the insurer with power to collect regular premiums and
in this case the last previous one paid by the insured and
upheld the reinstatement and the effect of the insurance
as being in force. A second Massachusetts case in the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, March 1,
1917, is Lamontagne v. Standard Life and Accident Insurance Company, 115 N. E. 244. There the question was
whether there was evidence which would warrant a finding that the defendant insurance company was not liable
unless plaintiff had complied with their "immediate written notice" requirement that a notice of the claim be
given to the company at its home office or "its duly
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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authorized agent" There was no notice to the home
office. However, the question was whether notice to an
agent empowered to issue a policy, received premiums
to be forwarded to the home office less the agent's commission, and who in fact had received from the insurance
company a general agent's commission on general liability
insurance business, was such a person as would constitute
a duly authorized agent for receiving notice on an accident. The jury found that the sales agent was clothed
with sufficient powers that the plaintiff who gave the
agent notice was justified in assuming that it would be
a sufficient compliance with that condition within the
policy. The Court sustained the lower court on appeal
that this sales agent was "duly authorized" to accept
notice of claim within the meaning of the policy.
A recent California case, Kuenstler v. Occidental Life
Insurance Company, 292 F. Supp. 532 (1968), in the
United States District Court for the Central District of
California, again involving an insurance company adds
additional illumination to the question of who may be a
duly authorized agent.
In this case the dispute was over $72.00 in medical
expenses from a private insurance company who was by
contract administering benefit provisions for the federal
government. On a dispute of the claim with the insurance
carrier and litigation that followed, an issue arose as to
whether or not this private insurance company was "duly
authorized as an agent of the United States," it being
important as effecting the question of whether or not the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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district court could take jurisdiction to decide the merits
of a claim against the company. The court, though there
was no written authorization other than the general business relationship of contracting insurance benefits, held
that the secretary of health, education and welfare was
authorized to enter into contracts with private insurance
carriers, and in this case did enter in with such a contract
with the defendant insurance company, and finally that
the defendant insurance company while acting in this
capacity, was a duly authorized agent of the United States
of America.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the courts
uniformly in disputes involving insurance company claims,
benefits and questions of whether the companies are
rightly approving claims have interpreted the provision
liberally recognizing, (1) the authority of a private insurance carrier as it functions under the Social Security Act,
(2) recognizing the rights of a claimant where notice was
given to an agent, though not to the home office on a
claim, (3) recognizing the authority and the binding nature thereof when a policy holder paid premiums on a
health policy after a lapse where the money was in fact
received by the agent, deposited and two weeks passed.
Based on the foregoing, in the case at hand, it would appear that the court should sustain a liberal interpretation
of what constitutes duly authorized and certainly recognize the authority of one acting within the scope of his
employment in a muncipality, or in a properly licensed
hospital, or other recognized testing or treatment facility
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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which had a "laboratory technician" whom they regarded
as not only authorized but qualified.
The question here is whether the statutes as set forth
by the legislature of the State of Utah and the grouping
of a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or duly
authorized laboratory technician contemplates any kind
of state authorization for the laboratory technician. There
is no legislative requirement that laboratory technicians
be licensed within the State of Utah, as is the requirement for practical nurses, registered nurses, or physicians.
In fact, it is the recognized established practice that laboratory technicians function without State licenses and
so recognized by the legislature in hospitals, in clinics,
and in this case in the City-County Health Department,
having received their training and recognition satisfactory
to those in the related professions and with whom they
work. The better reading of the statute, under the rules
of statutory construction, is to read the section as a whole,
which section provides that the police officer can request
the laboratory technician, a practical nurse, a registered
nurse, or a physician, to draw the blood.
The statute was amended in 1967 to change police
officer to peace officer and to include a practice nurse
category. Since peace officer is a broad category and
includes officers of various municipal, city, county and
state police agencies, one must conclude that those who
may act as peace officers are those from the various state,
city and city-county and municipal categories. Likewise,
it is reasonable to conclude that a laboratory technician
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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capable and properly authorized by the county government and the city government of Salt Lake City, respectively in absence of any state licensing requirement, was
one "duly authorized" pursuant to the statute and capable of administering the test. It is analogous to conclude
that as peace officers, representing various city and municipal governments act in their own capacity and authority on behalf of the peace-keeping mission and on behalf
of their work in the broad police power of the state, so
also Mr. Davis in his city-county employee status could
act in concert with Trooper Smith pursuant to the statute
in this case. It must be the conclusion that Mr. Davis,
an experienced laboratory technician for Salt Lake City
and Salt Lake County is a "duly authorized laboratory"
technician to so act under the statute, though he did not
have on his person or present in court a writing, a certificate, or a diploma indicating any specific authorization
from the State of Utah, since none is required by the legislature of the State of Utah, as is the case in the other
three of the four categories mentioned, vis. practical
nurses, registered nurses, and physicians.
It was error on the part of the court to rule that this
matter should be granted as to the petition of the respondent solely on the technical question of the presence
of a "duly authorized laboratory technician" in the absence of state requirements therefore and not to consider
the matter on its merits. The choice of tests was properly
with the trooper and had the question been raised by
either Mr. Reagan or respondent at the time, concerning
their dispute as to the authority of Mr. Davis, it could
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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have simply been a matter of giving to Mr. Gibb a breathalyzer test at that moment. Trooper Smith was authorized and capable of giving the test. That alternative did
not in fact exist because Mr. Reagan advised and Mr.
Gibb advised that Mr. Gibb would take no tests until
his attorney was present. A close case on point is a California case, Westmorland v. Chapman, 74 Cal. Rptr. 363,
268 C. A. 2d 1 (1969), which upheld a refusal, under California law, which is similar to Utah's law, except the descriptive terms vary, reads "duly licensed clinical laboratory technologist or clinical laboratory bioanalyst." A
party was challenging the refusal revocation based on
the failure of the arresting officer to advise him that a
licensed technician is authorized (emphasis ours) to take
the blood specimen, the court held that the implied consent law does not impose the duty on the arresting officer to advise a driver that the licensed technician is authorized to take the blood specimen.
The lower court committed error further in light of
the testimony, which was unrdbutted, that it was intended by Mr. Gibb that if the officer did not wait until
the attorney was present that somehow they could get
by the hearing or the law requiring him to take such a
test.
POINT II.

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RIGHT TO COUNSEL MEANT THAT RESPONDENT HAD THE RIGHT TO HAVE
HIS ATTORNEY PHYSICALLY PRESENT
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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IN THE COUNTY JAIL PRIOR TO HIS
TAKING THE BLOOD TEST AFTER HE
HAD HAD TWO OPPORTUNITIES TO CONVERSE WITH HIS COUNSEL ON THE
T E L E P H O N E ABOUT MATTERS SURROUNDING THE IMPLIED CONSENT LAW
AND HIS SUBMITTING OR REFUSING
SAID CHEMICAL TEST.
There is serious doubt in many jurisdictions that
such a right to counsel exists in the civil aspects of the
Implied Consent Law where an arrested party must decide whether or not to submit to a type of sobriety test.
Mills v. Bridges, 471 P. 2d 66, 93 Idaho 679; I. S. §
49-352; Garcia v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 456 P. 2d
85; Rust v. Division of Motor Vehicles, et al., 1971, 267
C. A. 2d 545, 73 Cal. Rptr. 366; Stratikos v. Department
of Motor Vehicles, (1968) 477 P. 2d 237; People v. Brown,
485 P. 2d 500; Johnson v. Department of Motor Vehicles,
485 P. 2d 1258, (Oregon 1971); Campbell v. Superior Court
in and for Maricopa County, 479 P. 2d 685, 106 Ariz. 542;
Goodman v. Orr, 1971, 97 Ctl. Rptr. 226, 19 C. A. 3rd 845.
Utah has not ruled squarely on this issue.
A recent Colorado case has held that Implied Consent statute is not unconstitutional on grounds that it
violates right to travel upon state highway, or that it
constitutes violation of due process by compelling citizen
to choose either his right to refuse to surrender evidence
that would help to convict him or his right to retain liDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cense to drive, or creates a crime of refusing to consent
to blood test punishable by forfeiture of right to drive
while denying fundamental rights of person charged with
criminal offense or that it enforces warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures, or that it sanctions invasion of privacy or privilege against self-incrimination.
(Emphasis supplied.) Const Art. 2 §§ 3, 7; U. S. C. A.
Const. Amends. 4, 9; 1967 Perm. Supp., C. R. S., Section
13-5-30(3) et seq. People v. Brown, 485 P. 2d 500. Brown's
appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court was dismissed for
want of a substantial Federal question. 92 S. Ct. 671.
The Implied Consent Law of California (prior to
amendment), Idaho and Oregon all have provisions similar to the language of Utah Section 41-6-44.10, U. C. A.
1953, as amended, section (a). In several cases before
the courts of last impression the decisions are unanimous
that the right to counsel before a decision to submit does
not exist on the civil aspect.
Even greater clarification of the "right to counsel"
and "presence of attorney" is provided by an Oregon
case on rehearing on the question of presence of his attorney, it was there held that the driver's refusal to take
a breath-analyzer test without having his attorney present was a refusal to take the test under the Implied Consent Law, and justified suspension of his driver's license.
(See Stratikos v. Department of Motor Vehicles, (1968)
477 P. 2d 237, adhered to and Supplemental 478 P. 2d
654; also Johnson v. Department of Motor Vehicles, et al.,
485 P. 2d 1258. See also Mills v. Bridges, 471 P. 2d 66, 93
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Idaho 679; Ent v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 265
A. C. A. 1073, 71 Cal. Rptr. 726; Finley v. Orr, 262 A. C. A.
711, 69 Cal. Rptr. 137
In the Ent and Finley cases the refusals were likewise upheld The language in another recent California
case is supportive (see Funk v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, 1 Cal. App. 3rd 499, 18 Cal. Rptr.).
A case on point is the Johnson case, supra, decided
June 17,1971, where the attorney advised taking a breathalyzer when he got there. (Emphasis ours.): The attorney did not come. The Court said that any erroneous
impression (emphasis supplied) upon which petitioner
relied in failing to take the test (he thought he could remain silent), was created by his counsel, not the police,
and the Court reversed the trial court, holding it was a
refusal. Johnson v. Department of Motor Vehicles of the
State of Oregon, Appellant, 485 P. 2d 1285.
In the case at hand, the respondent not only after
requesting to do so, contacted his attorney but did so on
two occasions and the attorney had an opportunity to
discuss the matter with the respondent. The "right to
counsel" as relates to the Implied Consent Law does not
mean the right to the physical presence of the respondent's attorney for monitoring or being present during
the Implied Consent chemical test.
Nor does the Hunter case, Hunter v. Dorius, 23 Utah
2d 122, 458 P. 2d 877, stand for the proposition that the
respondent or any one in like circumstances is granted
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the right to the personal presence of his attorney. The
Hunter case indicates that the respondent, when given
an opportunity to contact an attorney, by the peace officer, such as Trooper Smith,, has a reasonable time in
which to contact the attorney and thereafter has a reasonable time in which to make a decision as to whether
he will or will not submit to a chemical test. Clearly, the
Stratikos v. Department of Motor Vehicles case and the
Johnson v. Motor Vehicles case, supra, both stand for
the proposition that the driver's refusal to take a test
without having his attorney present was in fact a refusal
and further that if there was a misunderstanding in the
mind of the driver, the respondent herein, this was created by the attorney and not by the police officer. Certainly this is the case in the matter at bar. Though Mr.
Gibb refused to take the test, the officer made it very
clear to Mr. Gibb that he did not have a right to have
his attorney present, nor was it needful for him to be
present, that he could make his decision after conversing
with him on the phone, and that if he chose to wait, this
was not reasonable in the mind of Trooper Smith, and
if he thought he could continue to postpone the decision
until the attorney came, and if the officer were not present, thereby use that as a basis for getting around the
law, that was incorrect.
If correct, such procedure, of course, would be available to anyone who is attempting to circumvent the requirements of the right they have to drive on the highways of the State of Utah.
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POINT III.
RESPONDENT'S ACTION CONSTITUTED
A REFUSAL UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §
41-6-44.10 AND OFFICER SMITH WAS JUSTIFIED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO THE CHEMICAL
TESTS WAS COMPLETED.
The Utah cases relating directly to revocation of a
driver's license for failure to submit to a test under the
statute are only these: Bean v. State, 12 Ut. 2d 76, 362
P. 2d 750 (1961); Ringwood v. State, 8 Ut. 2d 287, 333 P.
2d 943 (1959); Hunter v. Dorius, 23 Ut. 2d 122, 458 P. 2d
877. The first two of these cases invalidate the revocation
because the officer failed to give the accused his choice
of which test of those offered under the statute he would
take. The 1967 Amendment added a second sentence to
paragraph a, leaving that decision within reasonable
grounds with the peace officer. See 41-6-44.10 (a).
"Any person operating a motor vehicle in
this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test of his breath or blood for
the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood, provided that such test is administered at the direction of a peace officer
having reasonable grounds to believe such person
to have been driving in an intoxicated condition.
The arresting officer shall determine within reason which of the aforesaid tests shall be administered" (Emphasis supplied.)
The Hunter case is distinguishable because although Dr.
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Hunter was clearly given his choice, he was given a chance
to contact an attorney which opportunity he took, and
the court said he should have a reasonable time to do so.
Here Mr. Gifob asked for an attorney, he had time to call
one, did talk to his counsel twice, and in the opinion of
the Trooper had adequate time to decide to take the test.
Courts have considered that an implied refusal is
sufficient. Calciano v. Hults, 13 App. Div. 2d 534, 213
N. Y. S. 2d 500 (1961); Clancy v. Kelly, 7 App. Div. 2d
820, 180 N. Y. S. 2d 923 (1958). The instant case is not
rested on solely the implication.
POINT IV.
A FAILURE OF ASSENT TO THE REQUEST
OF THE ARRESTING OFFICER TO TAKE
A CHEMICAL TEST IS A REFUSAL UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10 (1953),
AS AMENDED.
A Nebraska case, Johnson v. Dennis, 187 Neb. 95,
187 N. W. 2d 605, was a case of an action to contest the
revocation of a license under the Nebraska Implied Consent law which is similar to Utah's, except the refusal is
a criminal offense there, rather than a civil offense as is
the case under Utah law. The Supreme Court held that
a failure to reply to a direct inquiry as to which test
should be administered, as provided in the Implied Consent Act, was aquivalent to a refusal to take any of the
tests. In that case, the driver contended that silence was
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not a refusal and that the driver had not withdrawn his
implied consent to a blood test. The Nebraska Supreme
Court held otherwise and also cited as additional authorities: Bhttner v. Tofany, 312 N. Y. S. 2d 173, 34 A. D.
2d 1066; State v. Pandoli, 109 N. J. Super. 1, 262 A. 2d
41; Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P. 2d
685; DiSalvo v. Williamson, (R. L), 259 A. 2d 671; Clancy
v. Kelly, 180 N. Y. S. 2d 923, 7 A. D. 2d 820.
Prerequisites under Utah law are essential to the
validity of the revocation of a license They are:
a. The requirement of an appropriate invitation
to take the test including (a) the prerequisite arrest, (b)
sufficient probable cause to consider the invitee to be intoxicated, and (c) an appropriate opportunity to advise
which of the tests is to be applied.
b. The refusal, either expressed or implied, must
be communicated to, or reasonably presumed by the inviting officer.
The Court's attention is again drawn to the case of
Hunter v. Dorius, 23 Utah 2d 122, 458 P. 2d 877, from
which case appellant feels this case is distinguishable.
In the case before us, the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe the petitioner was intoxicated;
he gave him the appropriate warning, both Miranda and
the Implied Consent. Conditionally assenting to take the
test after being advised of his rights constitutes a refusal
as the test cannot be administered by force. The statute
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specifically states that on refusing "the test shall not be
given."
In the Hunter case, supra, it was a matter of the
attorney for Dr. Hunter asking on the telephone that he
be given a blood test after a previous refusal by Dr. Hunter, and the officer refusing to administer it because it
was too late in his opinion; but both the officer and Dr.
Hunter were still present at the police station when the
request for the blood test was made by counsel.
In the case at bar,, the Trooper had left by the time
the attorney came. The respondent had talked to his
attorney (R. 37), the attorney had talked to the officer
(R. 37, 38), the officer had informed both respondent (R.
27, 38, 42) and respondent's attorney that he was the only
car on duty at that time and that respondent should
make a decision to take the test then, and there was no
need for the attorney to come to the county jail (R. 41).
Respondent's answer after being fully advised of his
rights was that he would not submit to a test unless his
attorney was present, according to Trooper Smith (R.
39). However, at one point, to Mr. Davis, he admitted
affirmatively that he would refuse until his attorney was
present (R. 36). This testimony was never rebutted or
changed. Respondent's attorney told Trooper Smith the
same thing (R. 42).
The respondent was stopped at 4:01 a.m. Smith
advised him of his rights at 4:09 a.m. Trooper Smith
noted the refusal at 5:20 a.m. at the jail. Both Trooper
Smith and Trooper Tenney left the jail at 5:30 a.m.,
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after presenting the respondent for booking, having previously filled out the refusal form in part (R. 43) it being
the Trooper's opinion that a reasonable time had elapsed
from arrest and consultation with counsel for Mr. Gibb
to decide whether to submit to the chemical test (R. 43,
44).
Attorney Reagan stated for the record he was at the
jail at 5:25 a.m. He also raised the question as to what
constituted "right to counsel" and a phone call in his
opinion, was not such right as pointed out to the Trooper.
The Trooper reiterated that Mr. Reagan's presence was
not necessary as far as the refusal was concerned (R. 48).
In a recent California case, a more extreme case on
silence, Lampman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 28
Cal. App. 3d 927, 105 Cal. Rep. 101 (January 17, 1973),
the Court held at page 104 that, in face of the driver's
assertion that the officer should have attempted to administer one of the tests, to find out whether silence
meant a refusal in fact it was held the implied consent
law is designed to be an alternative in the routine cases
of suspected drunken driving to the use of compulsion
to obtain a chemical test, i.e., volition is substituted for
force, and therefore in essence, the officer is not required
to attempt to administer one of the tests.
The above case also sets forth as the principal issue
on appeal as to whether Miss Lampman's silence in the
face of repeated requests to submit to a chemical test
constituted a failure to submit to a test under their code.
The court held her silence infers (a refusal), the same
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meaning as the driver in the Cahall case. The court refers to this California case, Cahall v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 16 Cal. App. 3d, in explaining their holding: "There the driver, in response to a request for a
choice of test said T m not even going to give you an
answer.'" The court held in Cahall that the statement
amounted to a failure to submit to a chemical test.
This same Lampman case holds as a collateral matter
on the question that she was confused by the officer's
advice, that the true test in determining whether the
driver's failure to submit as a result of confusion "is not
the driver's state of mind, but the fair meaning to be
given her response to the request that she submit to a
chemical test." Supra, 105 Cal. Rep. 103.
In the case at hand, the mere fact that Mr. Gibb said
he was not refusing, would not negate the fact that his
choice to do nothing until his attorney came was a refusal. The very purpose of the Implied Consent Law is
to provide a volitional solution, not one of compulsion on
the taking of the chemical test, to which Mr. Gibb and
every other driver has given his consent. The statute
permits the suspected party to withdraw his consent. In
this case, Mr. Gibb's failure to assent to the test does
just that, and constitutes a refusal; further, the presence
of Mr. Lynn Davis to administer the test as one authorized by the health officials of Salt Lake County, was a
person "duly authorized" as contemplated by Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953), as amended, and is not a reasonable excuse to relieve Mr. Gibb from compliance with
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the request for a chemical test and the results flowing
therefrom.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING THE REVOCATION OF THE RESPONDENT'S DRIVER'S LICENSE TO REMAIN IN FORCE UNDER THE PRESENT
FACTS.
The record reveals that, though the respondent alleges he did not refuse the test or tests, Trooper Smith's
testimony and Mr. Davis' testimony (R. 26, 38, 39, 41)
was to the effect that by not taking the test until his
attorney came he may get around the law.
The statute, Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Ann.
(1953) does not require the officer to invite the respondent to take the test more than once. In this case the
officer invited him to take the test on two occasions and
in each case the respondent refused, until his attorney
was present. The Trooper felt that adequate opportunity
for counsel and adequate time for a decision had elapsed.
At that point, under the statute, it was the officer's
obligation that "the test shall not be given and the arresting officer shall advise the person of his rights under this
section." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953), as
amended. This the officer did.
We submit that the Judge in the trial court erred
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in not requiring the revocation to remain valid under
the circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Fundamental to the issues of this case are the two
questions basic to the ruling of Judge Wilkins. One, that
there was no right to adequate consultation with counsel.
Two, that the question of a "duly authorized laboratory
technician" was ambiguous and not well defined and that
a city and county authorized laboratory technician was
not one authorized by the state to act pursuant to Section 41-6-44.10 (f). Taking the second point first, the
appellant respectfully submits that inasmuch as the Utah
State Legislature has not spoken to the point that a state
authorization, licensing, or certification for laboratory
tchnicians within the state is required, that no state requirement exists and therefore, at the time the statute
was changed in 1967, to include registered nurses, practical nurses and "duly authorized laboratory technicians"
that custom and usage at the time of the enactment of
that legislation would require that any proper laboratory
technician qualified by the hospital, laboratory, city or
county government in which they were employed or
served, was a "duly authorized laboratory technician"
and that the one at court, Mr. Davis, was such an individual, meeting the statutory requirement.
If the Court holds with the appellant on that point,
then the first point comes into play, inasmuch as the
trial court said that they had decided the matter on the
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merits. On this point, appellant respectfully submits that
the facts demonstrate that respondent had adequate time
to contact his attorney, did in fact so contact him did
converse with him on two occasions from the jail, and
thereafter had an adequate time in which to decide
whether he would or would not take the chemical test
pursuant to the request of the peace officer. The respondent's failure to assent to a test in what was concluded
to be a reasonable time by the peace officer, without the
physical presence of his attorney, was properly concluded
to be and reported by the Trooper as a refusal.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
M. REID RUSSELL
Assistant Attorney General
BERNARD M. TANNER
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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